# The Home Minister signed off on it. Who is cracking India's phones, and whose phones have they cracked? — retained record

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source: [reddit](https://highsignal.app/data/reddit) (reddit:india)  published 2026-11-07 05:16 ingested 2026-11-08 02:37

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## extract

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# tl;dr

A letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 20 January 2026 records that Union Home Minister Amit Shah approved, on a note dated 17 January 2026, a proposal permitting the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to set aside the government’s Make in India procurement rules and buy the most powerful phone-cracking product sold by Cellebrite, an Israeli company whose tools forensic researchers have found used against journalists and activists in Serbia, Jordan, Kenya and Russia. The NIA’s own bid document names the Minister as the authority who granted the exemption. We have not seen the note itself and have sought it under the RTI Act. The contract has since been awarded for ₹4,97,99,515. It is one of fifteen procurement listings naming Cellebrite products that Indian agencies have published in 2026 alone, spread across eleven tenders. The buyers range from the NIA and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to the Department of Military Affairs and the police and forensic departments of Kerala, Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh. The Delhi Police has held Cellebrite tools since at least 2020, and the Home Ministry cleared three more for its Crime Branch in March 2025 through the same exemption route.

The question became urgent on 10 October 2026, when the Delhi Police detained YouTuber Dhruv Rathee ahead of the Cockroach Janta Party protest, held him for most of a day, and took his phone and his parents’ phones. Rathee has since said, on comedian Kunal Kamra’s podcast, that he believes the police attempted to copy the contents of his iPhone using Cellebrite and that the attempt appears to have failed because his phone ran a version of iOS newer than the tool could handle. His account has not been independently verified and the Delhi Police has not responded to it publicly, but the issue it raises does not depend on him. Scores of protesters, creators and journalists had their phones seized over those three days, and no law, rule or published procedure in India states when a seized phone may be unlocked, what may be copied from it, how long the copy may be kept, or who may read it. The one statutory power that comes close, the decryption power under Section 69 of the IT Act, is itself under challenge in a petition IFF filed in the Supreme Court in 2019, which remains pending. IFF has spent the past few months investigating how this software is entering Indian policing. This post sets out what the procurement record shows, what the law does not provide, and what we are asking the Delhi Police and the Home Ministry to answer.

# Background

Early on the morning of Saturday, 10 October 2026, a group of men in plain clothes arrived at a house in Sector 56, Gurugram, where Dhruv Rathee was staying with his parents. The Cockroach Janta Party had called a protest at Jantar Mantar that day to demand the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. The Delhi Police had refused permission for it, and across central Delhi mobile internet had been suspended, train services halted and barricades erected. PTI, citing the police, reported that [three Crime Branch teams carried out the detention](https://theprint.in/india/youtuber-dhruv-rathee-detained-by-delhi-police-ahead-of-cjp-protest-sources/3067531/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) and that Rathee was questioned at a Crime Branch office before being driven into Delhi. Reuters, quoting a police source, put the number of people detained in the central Delhi protest area that day at [about 200](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/over-200-detained-on-day-2-of-cjp-protest-in-delhi-protesters-alleged-police-excesses/articleshow/134874902.cms?from=mdr&ref=static.internetfreedom.in). When Rathee was released in the early hours of the following morning, he said he had been [kept away from his phone and his lawyer](https://www.thenewsminute.com/news/i-was-kidnapped-not-detained-youtuber-dhruv-rathee-after-being-released-from-custody?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) for most of the time he was held.

Journalists who went to cover the protest were treated in much the same way. DIGIPUB News India Foundation documented the detention of reporters from Newslaundry, [Scroll.in](http://Scroll.in), Navbharat Times and The Quint, several of them after they had shown their press cards, and Newslaundry said the police had seized the official phones its reporters were using. On 12 October, [we demanded that the Delhi Police return those phones and make the seizure records public](https://internetfreedom.in/where-are-the-journalists-phones-iff-demands-seizure-memos-and-answers-from-delhi-police/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). Nearly a month later, neither has happened, and nobody whose phone was taken has been told what was done with it while it was in police custody.

Rathee’s account turned a general suspicion into a specific allegation. On comedian Kunal Kamra’s podcast, in a conversation that also featured YouTuber Shyam Meera Singh, he said that his phone and his parents’ phones had been taken. Once his phone was returned, he said, he had technical experts examine it for a full day, and they found no spyware or other infection. He believes the police instead attempted to clone the phone using Cellebrite. The phone’s battery history, he said, showed it on charge for several hours while in police custody, which he took to indicate that it had been connected to a computer. He added that his phone was running a version of iOS newer than the one Cellebrite’s software could then process. [Patrika, which reported his remarks on 4 November](https://www.patrika.com/entertainment-news/dhruv-rathee-big-claim-phone-data-cloning-attempt-detention-kunal-kamra-podcast-cellebrite-spyware-21030045?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), noted that a battery log alone cannot prove that a phone was extracted. We are not in a position to confirm or rule out his account, and nothing in this post depends on it. What we can show, from the government’s own procurement records, is that the tool he named is being purchased across the Indian state without any law to govern its use, and that the Delhi Police has had it for years.

The Delhi Police’s possession of these tools has been known for some time. In December 2020, MediaNama reported that the [Delhi Police held Cellebrite’s UFED and Physical Analyzer](https://www.medianama.com/2020/12/223-exclusive-delhi-police-has-tools-extract-data-from-smartphones-iphones/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), along with MSAB’s XRY, Oxygen Forensic Detective and MOBILedit, at the National Cyber Forensic Laboratory in Dwarka. A Deputy Commissioner of Police told the publication that all the forensic tools through which data could be extracted were available. In July 2025, Astha Savyasachi [reported in The Wire](https://m.thewire.in/article/tech/delhi-police-ai-companies?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the Home Ministry had approved a Delhi Police request to exempt a list of foreign forensic tools from the Make in India clause. IFF later obtained the order itself, which the Crime Branch had attached to a tender for its cyber lab. [Dated 20 March 2025 and signed by an Under Secretary](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cfCqzmygsr81xEHtOA14hkyqJ044jkAp/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), it clears nineteen products by brand, three of them from Cellebrite: UFED 4PC, Digital Collector, and Inspector with MacBook Pro.

For the past few months, IFF has been tracing these purchases tender by tender as part of a wider investigation into how phone-extraction software is bought and used in India. Our tracker now holds about a hundred surveillance-related tenders published since July 2025, covering facial recognition networks, number plate readers and mobile forensic vans, among other systems. The Cellebrite records discussed below are drawn from it and have been checked against the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) and the state procurement portals. Some of this work is already public, including our reporting on the Delhi Police’s [use of signal jammers](https://internetfreedom.in/no-law-lets-the-police-jam-your-phone-iff-files-rtis-on-delhi-polices-signal-jammers/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)and on the facial recognition cameras it tendered for Ramlila Maidan before that ground was designated the city’s new protest site. 

# Analysis

# The Home Minister’s approval

The most significant document in the record is a one-page letter. On 20 January 2026, the Police Modernisation Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs at Jaisalmer House issued [a letter under file number 80016/2026/ADMIN NIA-HQ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QnfmEdfrJqJsFb6BDgQONflukAC8gToA/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), signed by Vinod Kumar Dubey, Assistant Commissioner (Procurement), and addressed to the Director General of the NIA. It refers to an NIA note of 20 August 2025 and conveys, in its own words, “the approval of the Hon’ble Home Minister for one time exemption from Public Procurement (Preference to Make-in-India) order 2017 and its subsequent revision order dated 19.07.2024” for the purchase of one Cellebrite Premium Tool with a three-year licence at a cost of ₹4,98,15,000. Its closing paragraph records that the ministry’s Integrated Finance Division concurred on 13 January 2026 and that the Home Minister approved the proposal on a note dated 17 January 2026. Seventeen days later, the NIA published [bid GEM/2026/B/7172473](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LRkjkKFbECbvabIFd-K0o_RCfgNr_om5/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) on GeM. Every GeM bid carries a field for the competent authority who waived the Make in India preference, and in that field the NIA entered: Shri Amit Shah, Hon’ble Home Minister of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

We have not seen the Minister’s note of 17 January 2026 itself. What we have are two of the government’s own records: the ministry’s letter conveying his approval, and the NIA’s bid naming him as the authority who waived the preference. Everything said in this post about the Minister’s role rests on those two documents, and we have sought the note under the RTI Act.

The purpose of the Make in India order is to require a government buyer to consider whether an Indian supplier can meet the requirement before public money is spent abroad. The file shows the question being asked in a form that could only have one answer. The reason the NIA recorded the bid for setting the order aside is a single line: “As no other Company is manufacturing the software with the same name and specifications”. Its [Proprietary Article Certificate](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C8cXfC_4TIkxjMKy8CROVaN2DhhNDWXK/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), issued under Rule 166 of the General Financial Rules and naming M/s Cellebrite DI Ltd. of Petah Tikva, Israel, as the sole developer and proprietor, adds that “No other make or model is acceptable.” This is true of every branded product, and it does not answer the question the order actually asks, which is whether an Indian product could perform the same function. Nothing in the record we have seen shows that anyone tested whether one could. A government that has made technological self-reliance one of its signature policies chose, according to its own ministry’s letter at the level of the Home Minister, to buy a foreign phone-unlocking tool on the basis of a brand name.

When the Delhi Police Crime Branch sought a similar exemption for nineteen forensic products a year earlier, the Home Ministry’s letter of 20 March 2025 conveyed the approval of “the Competent Authority” over the signature of an Under Secretary, without identifying that authority. The NIA’s single licence, by contrast, is recorded as having gone to the Minister himself, with his approval following four days after the concurrence of his own finance division. The record is also internally inconsistent. The bid gives 13 August 2025, the date on the Proprietary Article Certificate, as the date of the competent authority’s Make in India approval, five months before the Minister’s note. The certificate leaves blank the lines meant to record the concurrence of the finance wing and the approval of the Director General. The model listed on the bid is a licence with a one-year subscription, while the ministry’s letter and the [technical specification](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DGVk5KN_c7bETFtthJNZBMl-o_c-Wcw7/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) describe three years, and the bid asks the manufacturer for only one year of updates and support. Among the features the bid lists are “iOS Passcode Bypass” and “Password Recovery features to decrypt the devices”. Five bidders participated, and GeM now shows the contract awarded to Nextechno Gen Private Limited for ₹4,97,99,515, which is ₹15,485 below the estimate.

# Fifteen listings across eleven tenders

The NIA’s purchase carries the most senior approval on record, but it is part of a wider pattern. We checked every Cellebrite entry in our tracker against the records on GeM and the state procurement portals as they stood on 6 November 2026. We found fifteen separate listings published in 2026 that name Cellebrite products, spread across eleven tenders, three of which have already been awarded. Values are shown where the portal discloses them; many state bids disclose only the earnest money deposit.

|**Buyer**|**What is being bought**|**Published**|**Status on 6 Nov 2026**|**Value or award**|
|:-|:-|:-|:-|:-|
|National Investigation Agency (MHA)|Cellebrite Premium Tool, 3-year licence|6 Feb 2026|Awarded to Nextechno Gen Pvt Ltd|₹4,97,99,515|
|Serious Fraud Investigation Office (Ministry of Corporate Affairs)|Cellebrite Digital Collector and Inspector, 3-year subscription, bundled with an OpenText forensic imager|17 Mar 2026|Awarded to TNS Networking Solutions Pvt Ltd, contract dated 25 Mar 2026|₹21,98,350 in all, of which ₹11,99,780 for Cellebrite|
|Home Department, Kerala|Facility management service with Cellebrite Inseyets mobile extraction|16 Jul 2026|Awarded to Alibi Global Pvt Ltd|₹99,99,910|
|Department of Military Affairs, Central Delhi|Cellebrite Inseyets, 40 unlocks|3 Jul 2026|Technical evaluation|₹1,77,88,500 (estimate)|
|Department of Military Affairs, Central Delhi|Cellebrite Inseyets, 40 unlocks|24 Aug 2026|Financial bid opening|Not disclosed|
|Home Department, Himachal Pradesh|Cellebrite Inseyets Online Pro, 40 unlocks a year, 3 years|1 Sep 2026|Technical evaluation|Not disclosed|
|Directorate of Forensic Services, Himachal Pradesh|Three lots, a new Inseyets Online Pro licence (40 unlocks a year, 3 years) and 1-year and 2-year renewals|26 Aug 2026|Technical evaluation|Not disclosed|
|Directorate of Forensic Services, Himachal Pradesh|Three lots, the same new licence and the same two renewals|27 Jun 2026|Technical evaluation|Not disclosed|
|Karnataka State Police|Cellebrite Inseyets or equivalent|21 Aug 2026|Under evaluation|Not disclosed (EMD ₹12.29 lakh)|
|Karnataka State Police|Maintenance of Cellebrite UFED4PC, State FSL Bengaluru|10 Aug 2026|Under evaluation|Not disclosed|
|Karnataka State Police|Maintenance of Cellebrite UFED4PC and 3 years of Digital Collector|29 Jun 2026|Financial evaluation|Not disclosed|

The Serious Fraud Investigation Office, a regulator under the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, now holds the same brand of forensic software as the country’s counter-terrorism agency, under a contract dated 25 March 2026 that records the country of origin as Israel. The Department of Military Affairs is buying phone unlocks in batches of forty. Kerala’s purchase is framed as a facility management service, which suggests that the extractions there may be carried out by a private contractor’s staff rather than by police officers. Karnataka is renewing maintenance on older Cellebrite equipment at its state forensic laboratory while tendering for newer versions. Our tracker also lists twenty-five tenders for mobile forensic extraction software whose brand is not disclosed at the bid stage, most of them from state Home Departments, so the fifteen listings above are only those that name Cellebrite expressly. The buyers span the political spectrum, from the Union Home Ministry to the Left Democratic Front government in Kerala, and the vendor is the same.

Two older Delhi Police records precede all of this. The first is the Home Ministry’s exemption of 20 March 2025 naming three Cellebrite products for the Crime Branch. The second is [the cyber lab tender the Crime Branch floated five days later](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1sUq1MIO8fYug0jpkh5tg_I752pkU4YLx/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). It asked for generic items such as mobile phone imaging and extraction software and an all-in-one tool for phones, computers, drones and cloud services, and its [108-page request for proposal](https://drive.google.com/file/d/14Gn0tNzWQV7UNYOHqQe-jONdHW-sM8S0/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) specifies tools that can reach from a seized phone into the cloud accounts it is logged into. GeM now shows that tender awarded to 3rd Eye Techno Solutions Private Limited for ₹4,98,04,850, although the award record does not list the brands supplied.

# What the Premium tool is built to do

The clearest statement of what the Indian state wants from this software is the [two-page technical specification](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DGVk5KN_c7bETFtthJNZBMl-o_c-Wcw7/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the NIA attached to its bid. It requires the tool to break phone passcodes by brute force on a long list of Android devices, including Samsung phones on Qualcomm, MediaTek and Exynos chips and Huawei phones on Kirin chips. On iPhones, it requires brute force from the A8 chip to the A13 chip, which it identifies as the iPhone 11 and the second-generation SE, and full file-system extraction from the iPhone 11 to the iPhone 14 on A13 to A16 chips or later, once the phone has been unlocked at least once since it was switched on. It must identify, extract and decrypt the Samsung Secure Folder, Huawei Private Space and Xiaomi Second Space, the protected areas each manufacturer offers its customers for their most private material, and it must allow extraction app by app, so that the stored data of a messaging or email application can be taken off the device by name.

A full file-system extraction goes far beyond a search for a single message. It copies what is stored on the phone, including chats, photographs, contacts, call logs, location history and the stored data of every app, and the copy remains after the phone is returned. A phone taken from someone at a protest while it is still switched on is, in the specification’s own terms, in exactly the after-first-unlock state that the tool is built to exploit. The same is true of a phone taken from someone in their home.

# No law governs when this may be done

India has no statute, rule or published protocol governing the forensic extraction of a person’s phone. In [Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India](https://www.scobserver.in/court-case/fundamental-right-to-privacy?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), decided in August 2017, the Supreme Court held that privacy is a fundamental right and that any intrusion on it must rest on a law, pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate to that aim. Copying the entire contents of a phone fails the first of those tests before the others arise, because there is no law that authorises it, sets its limits or provides for oversight.

The provisions that come closest do not fill the gap. Section 106 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) permits the police to seize property connected to an offence, and Section 105 requires searches and seizures to be recorded on video, but neither says anything about unlocking a device or extracting its data. Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 governs how electronic records are certified for use in court; it pr

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# tl;dr

A letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 20 January 2026 records that Union Home Minister Amit Shah approved, on a note dated 17 January 2026, a proposal permitting the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to set aside the government’s Make in India procurement rules and buy the most powerful phone-cracking product sold by Cellebrite, an Israeli company whose tools forensic researchers have found used against journalists and activists in Serbia, Jordan, Kenya and Russia. The NIA’s own bid document names the Minister as the authority who granted the exemption. We have not seen the note itself and have sought it under the RTI Act. The contract has since been awarded for ₹4,97,99,515. It is one of fifteen procurement listings naming Cellebrite products that Indian agencies have published in 2026 alone, spread across eleven tenders. The buyers range from the NIA and the Serious Fraud Investigation Office to the Department of Military Affairs and the police and forensic departments of Kerala, Karnataka and Himachal Pradesh. The Delhi Police has held Cellebrite tools since at least 2020, and the Home Ministry cleared three more for its Crime Branch in March 2025 through the same exemption route.

The question became urgent on 10 October 2026, when the Delhi Police detained YouTuber Dhruv Rathee ahead of the Cockroach Janta Party protest, held him for most of a day, and took his phone and his parents’ phones. Rathee has since said, on comedian Kunal Kamra’s podcast, that he believes the police attempted to copy the contents of his iPhone using Cellebrite and that the attempt appears to have failed because his phone ran a version of iOS newer than the tool could handle. His account has not been independently verified and the Delhi Police has not responded to it publicly, but the issue it raises does not depend on him. Scores of protesters, creators and journalists had their phones seized over those three days, and no law, rule or published procedure in India states when a seized phone may be unlocked, what may be copied from it, how long the copy may be kept, or who may read it. The one statutory power that comes close, the decryption power under Section 69 of the IT Act, is itself under challenge in a petition IFF filed in the Supreme Court in 2019, which remains pending. IFF has spent the past few months investigating how this software is entering Indian policing. This post sets out what the procurement record shows, what the law does not provide, and what we are asking the Delhi Police and the Home Ministry to answer.

# Background

Early on the morning of Saturday, 10 October 2026, a group of men in plain clothes arrived at a house in Sector 56, Gurugram, where Dhruv Rathee was staying with his parents. The Cockroach Janta Party had called a protest at Jantar Mantar that day to demand the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner. The Delhi Police had refused permission for it, and across central Delhi mobile internet had been suspended, train services halted and barricades erected. PTI, citing the police, reported that [three Crime Branch teams carried out the detention](https://theprint.in/india/youtuber-dhruv-rathee-detained-by-delhi-police-ahead-of-cjp-protest-sources/3067531/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) and that Rathee was questioned at a Crime Branch office before being driven into Delhi. Reuters, quoting a police source, put the number of people detained in the central Delhi protest area that day at [about 200](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/over-200-detained-on-day-2-of-cjp-protest-in-delhi-protesters-alleged-police-excesses/articleshow/134874902.cms?from=mdr&ref=static.internetfreedom.in). When Rathee was released in the early hours of the following morning, he said he had been [kept away from his phone and his lawyer](https://www.thenewsminute.com/news/i-was-kidnapped-not-detained-youtuber-dhruv-rathee-after-being-released-from-custody?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) for most of the time he was held.

Journalists who went to cover the protest were treated in much the same way. DIGIPUB News India Foundation documented the detention of reporters from Newslaundry, [Scroll.in](http://Scroll.in), Navbharat Times and The Quint, several of them after they had shown their press cards, and Newslaundry said the police had seized the official phones its reporters were using. On 12 October, [we demanded that the Delhi Police return those phones and make the seizure records public](https://internetfreedom.in/where-are-the-journalists-phones-iff-demands-seizure-memos-and-answers-from-delhi-police/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). Nearly a month later, neither has happened, and nobody whose phone was taken has been told what was done with it while it was in police custody.

Rathee’s account turned a general suspicion into a specific allegation. On comedian Kunal Kamra’s podcast, in a conversation that also featured YouTuber Shyam Meera Singh, he said that his phone and his parents’ phones had been taken. Once his phone was returned, he said, he had technical experts examine it for a full day, and they found no spyware or other infection. He believes the police instead attempted to clone the phone using Cellebrite. The phone’s battery history, he said, showed it on charge for several hours while in police custody, which he took to indicate that it had been connected to a computer. He added that his phone was running a version of iOS newer than the one Cellebrite’s software could then process. [Patrika, which reported his remarks on 4 November](https://www.patrika.com/entertainment-news/dhruv-rathee-big-claim-phone-data-cloning-attempt-detention-kunal-kamra-podcast-cellebrite-spyware-21030045?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), noted that a battery log alone cannot prove that a phone was extracted. We are not in a position to confirm or rule out his account, and nothing in this post depends on it. What we can show, from the government’s own procurement records, is that the tool he named is being purchased across the Indian state without any law to govern its use, and that the Delhi Police has had it for years.

The Delhi Police’s possession of these tools has been known for some time. In December 2020, MediaNama reported that the [Delhi Police held Cellebrite’s UFED and Physical Analyzer](https://www.medianama.com/2020/12/223-exclusive-delhi-police-has-tools-extract-data-from-smartphones-iphones/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), along with MSAB’s XRY, Oxygen Forensic Detective and MOBILedit, at the National Cyber Forensic Laboratory in Dwarka. A Deputy Commissioner of Police told the publication that all the forensic tools through which data could be extracted were available. In July 2025, Astha Savyasachi [reported in The Wire](https://m.thewire.in/article/tech/delhi-police-ai-companies?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the Home Ministry had approved a Delhi Police request to exempt a list of foreign forensic tools from the Make in India clause. IFF later obtained the order itself, which the Crime Branch had attached to a tender for its cyber lab. [Dated 20 March 2025 and signed by an Under Secretary](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cfCqzmygsr81xEHtOA14hkyqJ044jkAp/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), it clears nineteen products by brand, three of them from Cellebrite: UFED 4PC, Digital Collector, and Inspector with MacBook Pro.

For the past few months, IFF has been tracing these purchases tender by tender as part of a wider investigation into how phone-extraction software is bought and used in India. Our tracker now holds about a hundred surveillance-related tenders published since July 2025, covering facial recognition networks, number plate readers and mobile forensic vans, among other systems. The Cellebrite records discussed below are drawn from it and have been checked against the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) and the state procurement portals. Some of this work is already public, including our reporting on the Delhi Police’s [use of signal jammers](https://internetfreedom.in/no-law-lets-the-police-jam-your-phone-iff-files-rtis-on-delhi-polices-signal-jammers/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)and on the facial recognition cameras it tendered for Ramlila Maidan before that ground was designated the city’s new protest site. 

# Analysis

# The Home Minister’s approval

The most significant document in the record is a one-page letter. On 20 January 2026, the Police Modernisation Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs at Jaisalmer House issued [a letter under file number 80016/2026/ADMIN NIA-HQ](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1QnfmEdfrJqJsFb6BDgQONflukAC8gToA/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), signed by Vinod Kumar Dubey, Assistant Commissioner (Procurement), and addressed to the Director General of the NIA. It refers to an NIA note of 20 August 2025 and conveys, in its own words, “the approval of the Hon’ble Home Minister for one time exemption from Public Procurement (Preference to Make-in-India) order 2017 and its subsequent revision order dated 19.07.2024” for the purchase of one Cellebrite Premium Tool with a three-year licence at a cost of ₹4,98,15,000. Its closing paragraph records that the ministry’s Integrated Finance Division concurred on 13 January 2026 and that the Home Minister approved the proposal on a note dated 17 January 2026. Seventeen days later, the NIA published [bid GEM/2026/B/7172473](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LRkjkKFbECbvabIFd-K0o_RCfgNr_om5/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) on GeM. Every GeM bid carries a field for the competent authority who waived the Make in India preference, and in that field the NIA entered: Shri Amit Shah, Hon’ble Home Minister of India, Ministry of Home Affairs.

We have not seen the Minister’s note of 17 January 2026 itself. What we have are two of the government’s own records: the ministry’s letter conveying his approval, and the NIA’s bid naming him as the authority who waived the preference. Everything said in this post about the Minister’s role rests on those two documents, and we have sought the note under the RTI Act.

The purpose of the Make in India order is to require a government buyer to consider whether an Indian supplier can meet the requirement before public money is spent abroad. The file shows the question being asked in a form that could only have one answer. The reason the NIA recorded the bid for setting the order aside is a single line: “As no other Company is manufacturing the software with the same name and specifications”. Its [Proprietary Article Certificate](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C8cXfC_4TIkxjMKy8CROVaN2DhhNDWXK/view?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), issued under Rule 166 of the General Financial Rules and naming M/s Cellebrite DI Ltd. of Petah Tikva, Israel, as the sole developer and proprietor, adds that “No other make or model is acceptable.” This is true of every branded product, and it does not answer the question the order actually asks, which is whether an Indian product could perform the same function. Nothing in the record we have seen shows that anyone tested whether one could. A government that has made technological self-reliance one of its signature policies chose, according to its own ministry’s letter at the level of the Home Minister, to buy a foreign phone-unlocking tool on the basis of a brand name.

When the Delhi Police Crime Branch sought a similar exemption for nineteen forensic products a year earlier, the Home Ministry’s letter of 20 March 2025 conveyed the approval of “the Competent Authority” over the signature of an Under Secretary, without identifying that authority. The NIA’s single licence, by contrast, is recorded as having gone to the Minister himself, with his approval following four days after the concurrence of his own finance division. The record is also internally inconsistent. The bid gives 13 August 2025, the date on the Proprie
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document fetched 2026-11-08 00:23 · canonical https://reddit.com/r/india/comments/1xpybif/the_home_minister_signed_off_on_it_who_is
