# Prison jammers in Bengaluru have left residents without signal for nearly two years — retained record

> Retained reddit record from reddit:india.

Canonical: https://highsignal.app/data/records/16bca3f54c6d65ea

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source: [reddit](https://highsignal.app/data/reddit) (reddit:india)  published 2026-11-17 05:48 ingested 2026-11-18 02:38

[original source ↗](https://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/1xycj33/prison_jammers_in_bengaluru_have_left_residents/)

## extract

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# tl;dr

On 11 September 2026, a resident of Parappana Agrahara in south Bengaluru wrote to us. Since February 2025, he said, calls drop, mobile data fails, OTPs do not arrive and UPI payments do not go through in the area around Bengaluru Central Prison. Records he obtained under the Right to Information (RTI) Act show why. The prison has 19 jammers and three call blocking towers. On 19 and 20 September 2025, the Wireless Monitoring Organisation (WMO) of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) tested them and found mobile networks affected up to 500 to 700 metres from the prison entrance. Its report of 3 October 2025 said this "appears to violate prevailing guidelines" and called for "immediate and mandatory action".

More than a year later, residents report no improvement. On 30 September 2026, the WMO's Bengaluru station wrote that the agencies concerned had been "requested" to confine the blocking to the prison "to the maximum extent technically feasible". For residents, this is a partial shutdown of telecom services with no suspension order, time limit or review. We have written to DoT, the WMO, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Government of Karnataka, and we are filing RTI applications.

# Background

The resident has shared the replies he received from the State and Union governments over more than a year of complaints. This post is based on those records and on press reports.

Two systems at the prison are meant to stop prisoners from using smuggled phones. Telecom operators have put up three Tower-Harmonics Call Blocking System (T-HCBS) towers. These send out a stronger signal than ordinary mobile towers, so nearby phones latch on to them. But they are not part of the public network, and a phone connected to one can neither make calls nor use data. Telecommunications Consultants India Limited (TCIL), a public sector company, has installed 19 jammers, which transmit on the frequencies used by 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G and Wi-Fi and overpower a phone's signal. The WMO's report calls them "high-power devices" that can transmit up to 100 W. It notes that the prison, which has a capacity of about 5,000 prisoners, "is located next to a densely populated residential area".

The towers were installed in January 2024. On 8 June 2024, dozens of residents [protested at Jail Circle](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/protest-erupts-over-network-jamming-at-parappana-agrahara-in-bengaluru-3058711?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). They said a system meant to work within 100 metres was blocking networks 700 metres or more from the prison and affecting over 20,000 people.

The resident dates the present disruption to February 2025. The Karnataka Prisons Department has tied it to an upgrade of the 19 jammers. Its records show review meetings on 4 and 7 March 2025, and say that TCIL, DoT and the four operators, Airtel, BSNL, Vi and Jio, were told to fix the problem. In April 2025, [MediaNama reported](https://www.medianama.com/2025/04/223-mangaluru-jail-jammers-otp-upi-failure-internet/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that TCIL had decided to send the jammers to Bhopal for recalibration, and quoted a resident who said they were never sent. In June 2025, the Director General of Prisons [told the Deccan Herald](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/prison-jammers-force-locals-to-scramble-for-signal-3-3586443?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the old 2G jammers in the State's central prisons had stopped working and that the government had ordered an upgrade to 5G. TCIL, the Director General added, had been told to recalibrate the new jammers to reduce their effect on nearby areas.

On 21 July 2025, the resident complained on the Karnataka government's IPGRS (Janaspandana) portal. The Prisons Department replied three days later, in Kannada. It said the network problems arose from the upgrading of the prison's 19 mobile jammers under a government order, and that TCIL, DoT, the four operators and the prison's Chief Superintendent had been told to resolve them urgently. The portal then closed the complaint as "accepted & redressed".

Complaints on the Union government's CPGRAMS portal went no further. On 31 July 2025, his operator, Reliance Jio, blamed an "adverse climatic condition" and said the fault would be fixed in 15 days. On 31 August, in reply to a second complaint, it said the jammers had been placed on the "express instructions" of the authorities and "nothing further can be done in this regard". His appeal, which sought a refund of ₹3,500, was closed on 5 September with the same answer.

On 19 and 20 September 2025, the WMO's Bengaluru station tested both systems with DoT's Karnataka field office, the operators, TCIL and prison officials. On the first day the jammers were on and the towers off. On the second, the towers were on and the jammers off. A test with both switched off could not be held because "the permission was not granted due to security reasons".

Field sheets signed for the WMO, DoT, TCIL and the prison record what worked on each of the four networks at nine points. With the towers on, no network worked at the main gate or opposite the new DIG office, 100 metres away. With the jammers on, data and WhatsApp failed on every network at First Cross, Central Jail Road, 200 metres away, and at the Central Jail Circle bus stop, 490 metres away. On the seventh floor of Mahaveer Ranches, an apartment complex 416 metres away, nothing worked on any network on either day. At SJR Blue Waters, 648 metres away, Jio failed with the jammers on and BSNL with the towers on. The farthest point was a D-Mart store 1.6 km away. All four networks worked there on the second day, but on the first the sheet shows no Jio data or WhatsApp.

The station's report, dated 3 October 2025, was copied to the Director General of Prisons, the operators and TCIL. It found that both systems affect mobile networks up to about 500 to 700 metres from the prison entrance, and that the jammers also affect Wi-Fi. The spread of these signals beyond the prison, it said, "appears to violate prevailing guidelines that mandate the strict confinement of blocking signals". It asked the operators to lower the power of the towers and to turn or tilt their antennas towards the prison. It asked TCIL to lower the power of the jammers, to jam only downlink frequencies, on which towers transmit to phones, and to use low power in the Wi-Fi bands. On 13 November 2025, WMO headquarters wrote to the Director General of Prisons, with a copy to the prison's Chief Superintendent, asking that corrective measures be "implemented immediately".

The matter reached the legislature the next month. On 9 December 2025, G. Parameshwara, then Home Minister, [told the Legislative Assembly](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/parappana-agrahara-central-prison-jammers-issue-g-parameshwara-to-hold-meeting-on-december-22-3825791?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that he had held four meetings with the operators and would hold another on 22 December, and that the jammers could not be switched off. M. Krishnappa, the MLA who raised the issue, said around 10,000 people live in the area. On 18 December, the minister [told the Legislative Council](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/home-minister-prison-videos-which-went-viral-were-from-bjp-s-tenure-3836122?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that "the residents around the prisons are unable to get a phone network".

On 16 and 22 December 2025, the resident and a neighbour filed RTI applications with the WMO. Its reply of 14 January 2026 gave them the report, the letter and a set of guidelines, which we discuss below.

On 3 July 2026, the resident complained to the Karnataka State Human Rights Commission (KSHRC). On 20 July, the Commission asked the Director General of Prisons for a report by 10 September. A reminder followed on 11 September. On 11 November, the Commission recorded "Report Not Received" and set a new date of 7 January 2027.

The resident also filed a fresh grievance with the Union government on 15 September 2026. The WMO's Bengaluru station replied on 30 September. An operator, it said, had reported that "network optimisation has already been carried out to restrict mobile signals within the prison" and that further optimisation "must be undertaken carefully", since it could let signals into the prison. TCIL, the operators and the Prisons Department had been "requested" to confine the effect of the systems to the prison "to the maximum extent technically feasible", and action-taken reports "will be obtained". The resident wrote back the same afternoon that the problem had continued since February 2025.

# Analysis

# A shutdown without an order

When the government wants to suspend telecom services in an area, the law requires an order. Under section 20 of the [Telecommunications Act, 2023](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/20101/1/A202344.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) and the [Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024](https://eservices.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/circular-notifications/temporary-suspension-of-services-rules-2024.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), it must ordinarily come from the Union or State Home Secretary, with reasons in writing. The order must be published, a review committee must meet within five days, and no suspension may last more than 15 days. In [*Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India*](https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/28817/28817_2019_2_1501_19350_Judgement_10-Jan-2020.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), decided on 10 January 2020, the Supreme Court held that speech and trade carried on over the internet are protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), that any restriction must be necessary and proportionate, and that an indefinite suspension is impermissible.

None of this has happened at Parappana Agrahara. By the resident's account, the disruption has lasted 21 months. No suspension order has been issued and no review has been held, because the government does not treat the loss of service as a suspension. For someone who cannot receive a bank OTP or call an ambulance from home, the result is the same. Signal blocking that reaches into people's homes restricts the same freedoms as a suspension order and should meet the same tests.

# The government's own report shows the harm can be avoided

In [*Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91938676/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (2017), the Supreme Court held that any intrusion into privacy must be backed by law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate to it. *Anuradha Bhasin* requires the State to choose the least restrictive measure that will serve its purpose, and Rule 3(4) of the 2024 Rules permits a suspension only where that purpose cannot be achieved by other reasonable means. Keeping phones out of prisons is a legitimate aim. But the WMO, the government's technical authority on radio interference, has listed less restrictive ways to achieve it. It has said in writing that lowering the power of the jammers will stop networks outside the prison from being blocked "while still keeping the prison security intact". After that finding, the present set-up cannot be called necessary.

The Kerala High Court, in [*Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala*](https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Shirin-R.K.-v.-State-of-Kerala.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (2019), recognised access to the internet as part of the rights to education and privacy under Article 21. The WMO's report itself records that the disruption affects "banking OTPs, and emergency assistance". The burden is also unequal. One neighbourhood bears the cost of a security measure without notice, consultation or remedy, which raises a question of arbitrariness under Article 14. Its residents still pay operators whose own towers block their service.

# DoT has not enforced its own findings

The government's position has softened in a year. On 3 October 2025, the WMO said "immediate and mandatory action must be taken". On 13 November 2025, it asked for the corrections to be "implemented immediately". By 30 September 2026, the aim was to confine the blocking "to the maximum extent technically feasible", and residents were told that their inconvenience "is noted". The same reply passes on an operator's view that further changes could let signals into the prison. That view is at odds with the WMO's findings of 2025, and nothing in the record shows that it has been tested.

DoT has the power to act. The guidelines the WMO supplied say that where a violation is noticed, the field office of DoT's Wireless Planning and Coordination Wing "shall take necessary legal action", which can include seizing equipment. Yet every communication in the record "requests" or "advises", and none names a date or a consequence. Each agency points to another: the Prisons Department to TCIL, DoT and the operators; the operator to the authorities; DoT to TCIL, the operators and the Prisons Department. The KSHRC has waited since 20 July 2026 for the Director General of Prisons to answer.

The test also had gaps, which probably understate the problem. No test was held with both systems off, so there is no baseline. The systems were tested on separate days and never together, which is how they ordinarily run. Nothing in the record says whether a phone that has latched on to a T-HCBS tower can reach the emergency number 112.

# No published rules for prison jammers

The WMO says the spillover appears to violate "prevailing guidelines". The only guidelines it enclosed with its RTI reply are the Cabinet Secretariat's [Jammer Guidelines, 2023](https://cabsec.gov.in/writereaddata/circular/policyonjammer/english/1_Upload_3730.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). A note at the top of that copy reads: "This document is applicable for jammers used in VIP movement and Examination halls". On prisons, the guidelines say only that, under an MHA office memorandum of 10 March 2023, the use of jammers in jails requires the Ministry's prior permission. We have not found that memorandum, any permission granted under it for this prison, or any technical standard for prison jammers in the public domain.

The guidelines say their norms are meant to ensure that jammers do not "unduly interfere" with mobile networks. But their only rule on how far a jammer's signal may reach is for examination halls, where jammers must "not interfere with existing mobile communication network outside examination centres". A jammer leased for the day of an examination is bound by that rule. A prison jammer that runs all day beside people's homes is bound by no published rule of the kind.

The guidelines also allow government bodies to use jammers only from authorised public sector vendors, at present Bharat Electronics Limited and Electronics Corporation of India Limited, and only models approved by the Secretary (Security). The jammers at this prison were installed by TCIL. The record does not show whether they are an approved model or what power was sanctioned.

The statute does not fill the gap. Section 48 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, in force since 5 July 2024, prohibits the possession or use of equipment that blocks telecommunication without the permission of the Union government or an authority it designates. Section 42 makes a breach punishable with up to three years in prison or a fine of up to ₹50 lakh. Rules [notified on 8 July 2026](https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/india/media-telecoms-it-entertainment/dot-notifies-rules-for-possession-of-radio-equipment?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) require that permission to accompany any application to possess a jammer. None of these says how far a prison jammer's signal may travel. Jammers used by the police are no better regulated, as [our RTI applications](https://internetfreedom.in/no-law-lets-the-police-jam-your-phone-iff-files-rtis-on-delhi-polices-signal-jammers/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) to the Delhi Police and [its replies](https://internetfreedom.in/delhi-police-spent-161-crore-on-signal-jammers-how-it-uses-them-is-highly-confidential/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) showed.

# The same problem at other prisons

Many Indian prisons stand inside cities, and their use of jammers is growing. On 12 August 2026, after a smartphone was reportedly found with a prisoner at Bengaluru Central Prison, Karnataka's Home Minister, Priyank Kharge, [ordered an audit](https://www.deccanchronicle.com/southern-states/karnataka/i-ordered-jail-raids-hm-priyank-on-phone-seizure-from-jailed-revanna-1978612?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) of the digital infrastructure of the State's prisons, jammers included. He said he had information that the jammers were "not working in some areas". Ten days later, the State Cabinet was [reported](https://thenewsmill.com/?p=578536&ref=static.internetfreedom.in) to have approved the purchase of portable signal jammers for prisons. Without a published and enforceable standard, people living near any prison can lose their phone service without being told why, or by whom.

In March 2025, the superintendent of the Mangaluru district prison [said](https://daijiworld.com/news/newsDisplay?newsID=1275754&ref=static.internetfreedom.in) he was receiving "continuous complaints" after a new jammer disrupted networks within about a kilometre. In June 2025, residents near the central prisons at Kalaburagi, Ballari and Belagavi [said](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/prison-jammers-force-locals-to-scramble-for-signal-3-3586443?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) they could not make calls or use the internet after the jammers were upgraded to 5G. Near Kalaburagi, the trouble reached villages 2 to 3 km away. In September 2026, the Home Minister [said](https://www.deccanchronicle.com/news/current-affairs/mangaluru-prison-jammers-to-be-fine-tuned-without-affecting-security-1988436?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the antennas and the capacity of the jammers at Mangaluru were being changed after a joint technical survey. This is the kind of correction the WMO sought in Bengaluru in 2025.

Residents near prisons in other States have reported similar trouble. In Punjab, over 15,000 people around Amritsar Central Jail [were affected by a jammer](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/amritsar/residents-protest-as-signal-jammer-disrupts-cellphone-connectivity/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) in September 2024, and people near Patiala Central Jail [reported call drops and missing OTPs](https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/locals-net-losers-as-patiala-jail-tests-mobile-jammers-for-inmates/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) in April 2025. In Delhi, an MLA [told the Assembly](https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/tihar-central-jail-to-get-improved-jammers-118080901586_1.html?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) in August 2018 that the jammers at Tihar were disrupting phones in nearby homes. In Kerala, residents near the central prisons at Poojappura, Viyyur and Kannur [said they lost 3G connections](https://www.onmanorama.com/news/kerala/2021/09/15/jammer-viyyur-poojappura-jail-illicit-phone-calls-drone.html?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) after jammers were installed.

Other countries have written rules for this. In England, Wales and Scotland, the [Prisons (Interference with Wireless Telegraphy) Act 2012](https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/20/contents?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) permits interference only under a written authorisation, and requires directions aimed at ensuring that it "will not result in disproportionate interference with wireless telegraphy outside" the prison. In the United States, state and local prisons may not jam signals at all. [Since 2021](https://www.fe

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# tl;dr

On 11 September 2026, a resident of Parappana Agrahara in south Bengaluru wrote to us. Since February 2025, he said, calls drop, mobile data fails, OTPs do not arrive and UPI payments do not go through in the area around Bengaluru Central Prison. Records he obtained under the Right to Information (RTI) Act show why. The prison has 19 jammers and three call blocking towers. On 19 and 20 September 2025, the Wireless Monitoring Organisation (WMO) of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) tested them and found mobile networks affected up to 500 to 700 metres from the prison entrance. Its report of 3 October 2025 said this "appears to violate prevailing guidelines" and called for "immediate and mandatory action".

More than a year later, residents report no improvement. On 30 September 2026, the WMO's Bengaluru station wrote that the agencies concerned had been "requested" to confine the blocking to the prison "to the maximum extent technically feasible". For residents, this is a partial shutdown of telecom services with no suspension order, time limit or review. We have written to DoT, the WMO, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and the Government of Karnataka, and we are filing RTI applications.

# Background

The resident has shared the replies he received from the State and Union governments over more than a year of complaints. This post is based on those records and on press reports.

Two systems at the prison are meant to stop prisoners from using smuggled phones. Telecom operators have put up three Tower-Harmonics Call Blocking System (T-HCBS) towers. These send out a stronger signal than ordinary mobile towers, so nearby phones latch on to them. But they are not part of the public network, and a phone connected to one can neither make calls nor use data. Telecommunications Consultants India Limited (TCIL), a public sector company, has installed 19 jammers, which transmit on the frequencies used by 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G and Wi-Fi and overpower a phone's signal. The WMO's report calls them "high-power devices" that can transmit up to 100 W. It notes that the prison, which has a capacity of about 5,000 prisoners, "is located next to a densely populated residential area".

The towers were installed in January 2024. On 8 June 2024, dozens of residents [protested at Jail Circle](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/protest-erupts-over-network-jamming-at-parappana-agrahara-in-bengaluru-3058711?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). They said a system meant to work within 100 metres was blocking networks 700 metres or more from the prison and affecting over 20,000 people.

The resident dates the present disruption to February 2025. The Karnataka Prisons Department has tied it to an upgrade of the 19 jammers. Its records show review meetings on 4 and 7 March 2025, and say that TCIL, DoT and the four operators, Airtel, BSNL, Vi and Jio, were told to fix the problem. In April 2025, [MediaNama reported](https://www.medianama.com/2025/04/223-mangaluru-jail-jammers-otp-upi-failure-internet/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that TCIL had decided to send the jammers to Bhopal for recalibration, and quoted a resident who said they were never sent. In June 2025, the Director General of Prisons [told the Deccan Herald](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/prison-jammers-force-locals-to-scramble-for-signal-3-3586443?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that the old 2G jammers in the State's central prisons had stopped working and that the government had ordered an upgrade to 5G. TCIL, the Director General added, had been told to recalibrate the new jammers to reduce their effect on nearby areas.

On 21 July 2025, the resident complained on the Karnataka government's IPGRS (Janaspandana) portal. The Prisons Department replied three days later, in Kannada. It said the network problems arose from the upgrading of the prison's 19 mobile jammers under a government order, and that TCIL, DoT, the four operators and the prison's Chief Superintendent had been told to resolve them urgently. The portal then closed the complaint as "accepted & redressed".

Complaints on the Union government's CPGRAMS portal went no further. On 31 July 2025, his operator, Reliance Jio, blamed an "adverse climatic condition" and said the fault would be fixed in 15 days. On 31 August, in reply to a second complaint, it said the jammers had been placed on the "express instructions" of the authorities and "nothing further can be done in this regard". His appeal, which sought a refund of ₹3,500, was closed on 5 September with the same answer.

On 19 and 20 September 2025, the WMO's Bengaluru station tested both systems with DoT's Karnataka field office, the operators, TCIL and prison officials. On the first day the jammers were on and the towers off. On the second, the towers were on and the jammers off. A test with both switched off could not be held because "the permission was not granted due to security reasons".

Field sheets signed for the WMO, DoT, TCIL and the prison record what worked on each of the four networks at nine points. With the towers on, no network worked at the main gate or opposite the new DIG office, 100 metres away. With the jammers on, data and WhatsApp failed on every network at First Cross, Central Jail Road, 200 metres away, and at the Central Jail Circle bus stop, 490 metres away. On the seventh floor of Mahaveer Ranches, an apartment complex 416 metres away, nothing worked on any network on either day. At SJR Blue Waters, 648 metres away, Jio failed with the jammers on and BSNL with the towers on. The farthest point was a D-Mart store 1.6 km away. All four networks worked there on the second day, but on the first the sheet shows no Jio data or WhatsApp.

The station's report, dated 3 October 2025, was copied to the Director General of Prisons, the operators and TCIL. It found that both systems affect mobile networks up to about 500 to 700 metres from the prison entrance, and that the jammers also affect Wi-Fi. The spread of these signals beyond the prison, it said, "appears to violate prevailing guidelines that mandate the strict confinement of blocking signals". It asked the operators to lower the power of the towers and to turn or tilt their antennas towards the prison. It asked TCIL to lower the power of the jammers, to jam only downlink frequencies, on which towers transmit to phones, and to use low power in the Wi-Fi bands. On 13 November 2025, WMO headquarters wrote to the Director General of Prisons, with a copy to the prison's Chief Superintendent, asking that corrective measures be "implemented immediately".

The matter reached the legislature the next month. On 9 December 2025, G. Parameshwara, then Home Minister, [told the Legislative Assembly](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/bengaluru/parappana-agrahara-central-prison-jammers-issue-g-parameshwara-to-hold-meeting-on-december-22-3825791?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that he had held four meetings with the operators and would hold another on 22 December, and that the jammers could not be switched off. M. Krishnappa, the MLA who raised the issue, said around 10,000 people live in the area. On 18 December, the minister [told the Legislative Council](https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/home-minister-prison-videos-which-went-viral-were-from-bjp-s-tenure-3836122?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) that "the residents around the prisons are unable to get a phone network".

On 16 and 22 December 2025, the resident and a neighbour filed RTI applications with the WMO. Its reply of 14 January 2026 gave them the report, the letter and a set of guidelines, which we discuss below.

On 3 July 2026, the resident complained to the Karnataka State Human Rights Commission (KSHRC). On 20 July, the Commission asked the Director General of Prisons for a report by 10 September. A reminder followed on 11 September. On 11 November, the Commission recorded "Report Not Received" and set a new date of 7 January 2027.

The resident also filed a fresh grievance with the Union government on 15 September 2026. The WMO's Bengaluru station replied on 30 September. An operator, it said, had reported that "network optimisation has already been carried out to restrict mobile signals within the prison" and that further optimisation "must be undertaken carefully", since it could let signals into the prison. TCIL, the operators and the Prisons Department had been "requested" to confine the effect of the systems to the prison "to the maximum extent technically feasible", and action-taken reports "will be obtained". The resident wrote back the same afternoon that the problem had continued since February 2025.

# Analysis

# A shutdown without an order

When the government wants to suspend telecom services in an area, the law requires an order. Under section 20 of the [Telecommunications Act, 2023](https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/20101/1/A202344.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) and the [Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024](https://eservices.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/circular-notifications/temporary-suspension-of-services-rules-2024.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), it must ordinarily come from the Union or State Home Secretary, with reasons in writing. The order must be published, a review committee must meet within five days, and no suspension may last more than 15 days. In [*Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India*](https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2019/28817/28817_2019_2_1501_19350_Judgement_10-Jan-2020.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), decided on 10 January 2020, the Supreme Court held that speech and trade carried on over the internet are protected by Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g), that any restriction must be necessary and proportionate, and that an indefinite suspension is impermissible.

None of this has happened at Parappana Agrahara. By the resident's account, the disruption has lasted 21 months. No suspension order has been issued and no review has been held, because the government does not treat the loss of service as a suspension. For someone who cannot receive a bank OTP or call an ambulance from home, the result is the same. Signal blocking that reaches into people's homes restricts the same freedoms as a suspension order and should meet the same tests.

# The government's own report shows the harm can be avoided

In [*Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/91938676/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (2017), the Supreme Court held that any intrusion into privacy must be backed by law, serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate to it. *Anuradha Bhasin* requires the State to choose the least restrictive measure that will serve its purpose, and Rule 3(4) of the 2024 Rules permits a suspension only where that purpose cannot be achieved by other reasonable means. Keeping phones out of prisons is a legitimate aim. But the WMO, the government's technical authority on radio interference, has listed less restrictive ways to achieve it. It has said in writing that lowering the power of the jammers will stop networks outside the prison from being blocked "while still keeping the prison security intact". After that finding, the present set-up cannot be called necessary.

The Kerala High Court, in [*Faheema Shirin R.K. v. State of Kerala*](https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Shirin-R.K.-v.-State-of-Kerala.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (2019), recognised access to the internet as part of the rights to education and privacy under Article 21. The WMO's report itself records that the disruption affects "banking OTPs, and emergency assistance". The burden is also unequal. One neighbourhood bears the cost of a security measure without notice, consultation or remedy, which raises a questio
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