# Who reads your vehicle record? NIC gave us numbers. MoRTH gave us a generic webpage. — retained record

> Retained reddit record from reddit:india.

Canonical: https://highsignal.app/data/records/a7e404d2bee954ff

[← sources](https://highsignal.app/data)


source: [reddit](https://highsignal.app/data/reddit) (reddit:india)  published 2026-10-20 08:58 ingested 2026-10-21 02:37

[original source ↗](https://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/1xan1wh/who_reads_your_vehicle_record_nic_gave_us_numbers/)

## extract

# tl;dr

Last month we[ wrote about](https://internetfreedom.in/less-than-2-for-your-name-and-home-address-how-vahan-and-sarathi-data-is-being-sold-online/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) a complaint we had received on the open market in VAHAN, SARATHI, e-Challan and PUCC records, sent a representation to MoRTH, NIC and CERT-In, and filed two applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005. NIC’s reply of 16 October 2026 contains the first account we have seen of how widely these systems have been queried from outside government. It records 338 credentials for private entities against 62 for government bodies, 25,314 credentials issued to private entities over the period, and 17,079,998 queries through those credentials between January 2024 and September 2026. The same reply mentions, almost in passing, that “the arrangement for sharing information with private entities was discontinued with effect from 01.10.2026 pursuant to the directions of MoRTH.” No reason or date is given for the direction, and we have found no public notice, order or news report of it. NIC also confirms that it received the disclosure made to CERT-In on 1 June 2026 about VAHAN records being sold through Telegram, and says the action taken and the date of any credential revocation “are not specified in the inputs presently available.” MoRTH, which issued the direction and which alone holds the names of the private entities, answered none of our twelve questions. Its reply, reproduced in full below, says that the Ministry deals with the Motor Vehicles Act, that implementing it is for the States, and that a data sharing policy is available on a website. It was written on 24 September 2026, a week before the switch-off took effect, and does not mention it. We filed a first appeal against MoRTH on 6 October 2026 and are filing one against NIC. The Play Store application that started this, which advertises owners’ names, addresses, financier, insurance policy numbers and chassis and engine numbers for ₹29, is still live.

# Background

In September 2026 an engineer wrote to us after years of writing to the authorities without a visible result. His point was that if private apps, websites and Telegram channels can return VAHAN, SARATHI, e-Challan and PUCC records on demand, there is a technical path from a government system to those services, and that path can be traced if someone with access to the logs chooses to trace it.

We tested one of the applications he named, and[ published what we found on 23 September 2026](https://internetfreedom.in/less-than-2-for-your-name-and-home-address-how-vahan-and-sarathi-data-is-being-sold-online/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). For ₹29 the “Vehicle Information App” sells 15 search credits, or about ₹1.93 a lookup. From a registration number alone it returned the owner’s full name, father’s name, present and permanent addresses, financier, insurance policy number, chassis and engine numbers, and PUC certificate number. The official Parivahan portal masks or withholds most of those fields and requires an OTP-verified account. On the same day we sent an eight-page representation to the heads of MoRTH, NIC and CERT-In, with copies to MeitY, asking that the matter be registered as a cyber security incident, that logs be preserved, and that a forensic audit trace the queries to their source.

# We have been here before

MoRTH sold bulk copies of VAHAN and SARATHI under its Bulk Data Sharing Policy of March 2019. In[ a Rajya Sabha reply of 8 July 2019](https://rsdebate.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/699683/2/PQ_249_08072019_U1698_p260_p261.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (Unstarred Question No. 1698), the Minister said that 87 private and 32 government entities had been given access and that ₹65 crore had been earned.[ RTI documents reported that September](https://www.medianama.com/2019/09/223-142-entities-that-bought-vahan-data/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) named 142 purchasers, among them banks, insurers and car makers. In February 2020[ we wrote to the Union Government](https://internetfreedom.in/we-have-written-to-government-asking-them-to-stop-risks-of-misuse-of-government-datasets/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) asking that public and private access to these databases be stopped, and the policy was[ withdrawn in June 2020](https://www.medianama.com/2020/06/223-bulk-data-sharing-policy-scrapped/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)on privacy grounds.[ We welcomed that](https://internetfreedom.in/morth-bulk-data-sharing-policy-scrapped/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) with a caution that the data already sold would stay sold, which is what happened. In[ a Lok Sabha reply of 11 February 2021](https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy-politics/story/centre-made-rs-100-crore-by-sharing-vehicle-data-with-private-companies-nitin-gadkari-287427-2021-02-12?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), the Minister put the total revenue at ₹1,11,38,79,757,[ listed 170 recipients](https://www.businessinsider.in/business/auto/news/centre-earned-100-crores-by-sharing-vehicle-registration-data-with-companies-such-as-bmw-axis-bank-bajaj-allianz-lt-and-others/articleshow/80879638.cms?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)including the Ministry of Home Affairs and law enforcement agencies, and said that no proposal to require deletion of the data was under consideration.

On 18 August 2025 MoRTH circulated its[ Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository](https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/circulars_document/Data-Sharing-policy-20082025-merged.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), which reopened API, portal and bulk channels to private recipients such as banks, insurers, vehicle manufacturers and “transport service providing agencies”, with personal data to be released on an Aadhaar-linked OTP consent. We[ explained the policy at the time](https://internetfreedom.in/data-highways-rights-roadblocks-an-explainer-on-the-national-transport-repository/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). It is an executive circular with no statutory backing; it names MoRTH as the data fiduciary and the approving authority; it has no public register of recipients and no grievance mechanism; and under clause 4.3 it gives police, law enforcement and national security agencies “complete access to all data parameters, including Personal Data.” Even before that, when[ MediaNama asked MoRTH under the RTI Act in 2025](https://www.medianama.com/2025/06/223-api-access-vehicle-data-sharing-raising-privacy-concerns/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) which private companies had API access, the Ministry confirmed that government organisations did and ignored the questions about private ones.

Then, on 1 September 2026, the security firm Cyderes published[ an investigation](https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/inside-indian-data-brokerage?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)into a Telegram brokerage selling live VAHAN records at ₹5 a query. The records, it found, were being drawn through API credentials issued to licensed identity-verification intermediaries, not through any breach of a government server. Its request logs ran from September 2025 to April 2026. Cyderes reported its findings to CERT-In and to the affected companies on 1 June 2026, and said that one route was still returning full records when it published.

# What we asked, and of whom

Our two RTI applications of 22 September 2026 were split by role.[ MoRTH](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FBL9sTsSro6mkrxANCVpiuXbRgCAj7rc/view?usp=sharing&ref=static.internetfreedom.in)(Registration No. MORTH/R/E/26/05057) was asked twelve questions about policy and authorisation, the names of private entities given API, portal or bulk access since 4 June 2020 and the data fields approved for each; the number of applications under the NTR Policy and how many were approved, rejected or pending; a copy of the undertaking private recipients sign and its clause on resale; whether AuthBridge (TruthScreen), Invincible Ocean, SurePass or the developer of the Vehicle Information App had held access; suspensions, debarments and audits; complaints about the sale of this data and the action taken; correspondence with CERT-In, MeitY, NIC and Google; FIRs filed; whether deletion was sought of data sold under the 2019 policy; the order deciding which fields are masked in public lookups; which entities other than MoRTH and NIC may send OTPs or SMS to vehicle owners; and the revenue earned each year since 2020-21. We asked that exempt portions be severed under Section 10 and that anything held elsewhere be transferred under Section 6(3).

[NIC](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EljvwlrDQGjqM4wrZ301kIOZuwMXCeDl/view?usp=sharing&ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (Registration No. NICHQ/R/E/26/00591), which builds and runs these systems, was asked sixteen technical questions, how many credentials had been issued to government and private entities, their validity and access conditions, monthly query volumes, how credentials are monitored, how long API, SMS and database logs are kept and whether any had been ordered preserved, the SMS sender IDs and OTP accounts, whether any third-party application had been found triggering Parivahan OTPs, the cybersecurity incidents received, whether the CERT-In disclosure had reached NIC and what followed, security audits, unauthorised access by staff or vendors, and which fields are masked in public lookups but released through private APIs.

# Analysis

# The sequence

Sequence of events, 1 September to 16 October 2026

We asked the Ministry on 22 September who has access to this data, on what terms, and what has been done about reports that it is being sold. Nine days later, sharing with private entities ended. We learned of that on 16 October, from NIC, in answer to a question about the number of credentials in circulation. MoRTH has not told us that it took the decision, when it took it, on what material, or why. Its own reply of 24 September says nothing about it. We are not in a position to say that the Ministry acted because of our representation or our RTI, and we do not say so. What we can say is that a Ministry which was about to switch off a national data sharing arrangement answered a citizen asking about that arrangement by pointing him to a webpage describing it. If the direction was already in train on 24 September, the reply should have said so. If it came afterwards, the public is entitled to know what prompted it. That question is now before the First Appellate Authority.

# What NIC told us

NIC’s reply, signed by its CPIO on 16 October 2026, runs to thirteen numbered parts. The figures it discloses are these.

Seventeen million queries over 33 months is roughly 17,000 lookups of individual records every day. NIC does not explain the gap between 338 credentials “recorded” and 25,314 “issued”. The likeliest reading is that 338 is a snapshot of the register when the CPIO ran his query, after the switch-off, and 25,314 is the cumulative number created over the period, with credentials renewed annually and issued per user or per integration; it is also possible that 338 counts approved entities rather than credentials. On either reading about 25,000 credentials were issued and are no longer on the register, and NIC gives no figure for how many of those were revoked, how many expired, and when. On the terms on which private entities held access, it says only that these “were governed by the MoRTH Data Sharing Policy in force during the relevant period.” It does not name a single holder.

# Query volumes fell by more than half between July and September 2025, and NIC does not say why.

NIC reply to RTI NICHQ/R/E/26/00591 dated 16.10.2026, query 5 table, January 2024 to September 2026

Between January 2024 and July 2025 the volume stayed between roughly 590,000 and 940,000 queries a month, averaging 695,366. It then dropped to 452,616 in August 2025, 278,164 in September and 239,659 in October, and from September 2025 to September 2026 it averaged 262,725 a month. The last month in the series, September 2026, is the lowest at 192,703. NIC offers no explanation. Two things coincide with the fall. MoRTH circulated the NTR Policy in August 2025, the month the decline begins, and NIC’s own list of cybersecurity reports records five received in July 2025, more than in any other month of the series.

# The CERT-In disclosure reached NIC. What followed is not on record, and the logs that would show it are expiring.

We asked whether NIC had received the disclosure made to CERT-In on 1 June 2026 and what action followed. Its answer in full, “The CERT-In disclosure referred to in the application was received. The action-related information and the date of credential revocation are not specified in the inputs presently available.” So the body that runs the system was told that its records were being sold through Telegram, and four and a half months later its CPIO could find nothing in the file about what was done or when any credential was cut off.

The retention periods NIC disclosed make this urgent. API logs are kept for one year, SMS logs for six months, and database logs “on an ongoing basis.” The operation Cyderes described ran from September 2025, with request logs to April 2026. On those periods the SMS logs for the whole of that window have already been deleted, and the API logs lapse month by month until April 2027. Our question on logs had two halves, the retention period and whether any instruction had been issued to preserve logs in connection with a complaint or investigation. NIC answered the first and said nothing about the second.

# Twenty-eight security reports, a half-finished migration, and an audit gap.

NIC lists 28 dates on which reported cybersecurity issues were received between January 2024 and September 2026, eight in 2024, ten in 2025 and ten in 2026, the most recent on 16 September 2026, six days before we filed. What was done about them is, in NIC’s words, “general in nature and is not mapped separately to each receipt date.” The general note says that vulnerabilities in the NextGen mParivahan application were addressed, that an issue in its Android version was resolved, and that vulnerabilities reported in older versions of the e-Challan application “were being addressed through migration to the NextGen e-Challan application. Migration had been completed in 22 States, with the process underway in the remaining States.” On the Ministry’s own technical partner’s account, then, a version of the national traffic enforcement application with known vulnerabilities was still running in some States when the reply was written.

On audits, NIC says the last three of VAHAN were conducted on 28 April 2023, 17 December 2024 and 17 December 2025, and the last three of SARATHI on 7 January, 7 July and 6 August 2026, by two CERT-In empanelled agencies. VAHAN, the system whose records Cyderes found on sale, has not been audited since December 2025, six months before the CERT-In disclosure; SARATHI has been audited twice since. NIC adds that no case of unauthorised access by staff, contractors or vendors has been reported in its records.

# No third-party app has been found triggering Parivahan OTPs.

The SMS sender IDs are SRTHDL and VAAHAN. Under the VAHAN header “multiple SMS and OTP accounts are in use”, whose names NIC has redacted “subject to the applicable provisions of the RTI Act, 2005”, without identifying which provision. The transaction counts it does give run into the hundreds of millions of messages a year. On the complainant’s question whether third-party apps are triggering government OTPs, NIC’s answer is no, “No such applications or entities have been identified as being able to trigger SMS/OTP through the specified sender IDs outside the identified arrangements. No unauthorised third-party application has been reported as having been identified in relation to the triggering of such SMS/OTP.” If that is right, the apps are not riding on the Parivahan OTP gateway, which leaves two routes for the data, credentials issued to licensed recipients and then resold or proxied, as Cyderes found, or copies bought under the 2019 policy and never deleted.

# How MoRTH disposed of the same questions in two days

Our application to MoRTH was received on 22 September 2026 and marked “REQUEST DISPOSED OF” on 24 September 2026. This is the Ministry’s reply in its entirety:

>*The undersigned is dealing with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (CMVRs). Both MV Act and CMVRs are available on this Ministry official website: www.morth.nic.in. Implementation of provisions of MV Act and CMVRs come under the purview of concerned State/UTs. With reference to RTI application it is stated that this Ministry has formulated a data sharing policy and placed it in public domain link https://services.parivahan.gov.in/ntr/ . Any citizen/ entity may apply for data subject to fulfillment of the conditions prescribed therein.*

None of the twelve points is addressed. No exemption under Section 8 or 9 of the[RTI Act](https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) is claimed, and no reasons, appeal period or particulars of the First Appellate Authority are given, though Section 7(8) requires all three whenever a request is refused. Taken on its own terms, the reply makes three moves, and none of them answers the application.

1. *It points to the law.* We did not ask for the law. The Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules are published, and nothing in them tells a citizen which private entities hold API access to the national vehicle register or what the Ministry did when told that its data was being sold. We asked for the records of how the Ministry has shared data under that law.
2. *It says implementation is for the States.* The National Transport Repository is maintained by MoRTH. Under the Ministry’s own NTR Policy, MoRTH is the data fiduciary and the approving authority for private access. The records we asked for are generated by the Ministry’s own approval procedures and sit in the Ministry’s own files.
3. *It points to the NTR webpage.* The page answers the question “what are the rules?” We asked who was let in under them. It carries the policy and blank application forms, not recipient names, application counts, signed undertakings, audit reports, suspensions, complaints, correspondence, FIRs, the masking order, the list of entities permitted to send OTPs, or revenue figures.

The Ministry has disclosed every one of these categories before. The Rajya Sabha reply of July 2019 gave entity counts, RTI documents in 2019 named 142 recipients, and the Lok Sabha reply of February 2021 gave revenue to the rupee and listed 170 recipients. What was disclosable to Parliament in 2021 cannot have become unanswerable in 2026 without a reason being stated. And the reply was written a week before the switch-off it does not mention, which is the question we have put to the First Appellate Authority.

# The app is still on the Play Store

The application at the centre of the complaint, listed as “Vehicle Information App” (package[ rto.owner.address.parivahan.car.malik.address.finder](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=rto.owner.address.parivahan.car.malik.address.finder&ref=static.internetfreedom.in)), remains live and installable on the Google Play Store as we publish this. We checked again on 17 October 2026.

Its listing still advertises the owner’s full name, present and permanent address, financier, insurance policy number and expiry, chassis and engine numbers, and PUC validity and number. It still carries the disclaimer that the developer has no association with any State RTO and that everything it shows is “publicly available on the Parivahan/mparivahan website.” It has gained roughly 600 reviews since we first examined it. We make no claim about where this application gets its data; that is what we asked MoRTH, and MoRTH did not answer. Nothing visible to a c

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# tl;dr

Last month we[ wrote about](https://internetfreedom.in/less-than-2-for-your-name-and-home-address-how-vahan-and-sarathi-data-is-being-sold-online/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) a complaint we had received on the open market in VAHAN, SARATHI, e-Challan and PUCC records, sent a representation to MoRTH, NIC and CERT-In, and filed two applications under the Right to Information Act, 2005. NIC’s reply of 16 October 2026 contains the first account we have seen of how widely these systems have been queried from outside government. It records 338 credentials for private entities against 62 for government bodies, 25,314 credentials issued to private entities over the period, and 17,079,998 queries through those credentials between January 2024 and September 2026. The same reply mentions, almost in passing, that “the arrangement for sharing information with private entities was discontinued with effect from 01.10.2026 pursuant to the directions of MoRTH.” No reason or date is given for the direction, and we have found no public notice, order or news report of it. NIC also confirms that it received the disclosure made to CERT-In on 1 June 2026 about VAHAN records being sold through Telegram, and says the action taken and the date of any credential revocation “are not specified in the inputs presently available.” MoRTH, which issued the direction and which alone holds the names of the private entities, answered none of our twelve questions. Its reply, reproduced in full below, says that the Ministry deals with the Motor Vehicles Act, that implementing it is for the States, and that a data sharing policy is available on a website. It was written on 24 September 2026, a week before the switch-off took effect, and does not mention it. We filed a first appeal against MoRTH on 6 October 2026 and are filing one against NIC. The Play Store application that started this, which advertises owners’ names, addresses, financier, insurance policy numbers and chassis and engine numbers for ₹29, is still live.

# Background

In September 2026 an engineer wrote to us after years of writing to the authorities without a visible result. His point was that if private apps, websites and Telegram channels can return VAHAN, SARATHI, e-Challan and PUCC records on demand, there is a technical path from a government system to those services, and that path can be traced if someone with access to the logs chooses to trace it.

We tested one of the applications he named, and[ published what we found on 23 September 2026](https://internetfreedom.in/less-than-2-for-your-name-and-home-address-how-vahan-and-sarathi-data-is-being-sold-online/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). For ₹29 the “Vehicle Information App” sells 15 search credits, or about ₹1.93 a lookup. From a registration number alone it returned the owner’s full name, father’s name, present and permanent addresses, financier, insurance policy number, chassis and engine numbers, and PUC certificate number. The official Parivahan portal masks or withholds most of those fields and requires an OTP-verified account. On the same day we sent an eight-page representation to the heads of MoRTH, NIC and CERT-In, with copies to MeitY, asking that the matter be registered as a cyber security incident, that logs be preserved, and that a forensic audit trace the queries to their source.

# We have been here before

MoRTH sold bulk copies of VAHAN and SARATHI under its Bulk Data Sharing Policy of March 2019. In[ a Rajya Sabha reply of 8 July 2019](https://rsdebate.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/699683/2/PQ_249_08072019_U1698_p260_p261.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (Unstarred Question No. 1698), the Minister said that 87 private and 32 government entities had been given access and that ₹65 crore had been earned.[ RTI documents reported that September](https://www.medianama.com/2019/09/223-142-entities-that-bought-vahan-data/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) named 142 purchasers, among them banks, insurers and car makers. In February 2020[ we wrote to the Union Government](https://internetfreedom.in/we-have-written-to-government-asking-them-to-stop-risks-of-misuse-of-government-datasets/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) asking that public and private access to these databases be stopped, and the policy was[ withdrawn in June 2020](https://www.medianama.com/2020/06/223-bulk-data-sharing-policy-scrapped/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)on privacy grounds.[ We welcomed that](https://internetfreedom.in/morth-bulk-data-sharing-policy-scrapped/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) with a caution that the data already sold would stay sold, which is what happened. In[ a Lok Sabha reply of 11 February 2021](https://www.businesstoday.in/latest/economy-politics/story/centre-made-rs-100-crore-by-sharing-vehicle-data-with-private-companies-nitin-gadkari-287427-2021-02-12?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), the Minister put the total revenue at ₹1,11,38,79,757,[ listed 170 recipients](https://www.businessinsider.in/business/auto/news/centre-earned-100-crores-by-sharing-vehicle-registration-data-with-companies-such-as-bmw-axis-bank-bajaj-allianz-lt-and-others/articleshow/80879638.cms?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)including the Ministry of Home Affairs and law enforcement agencies, and said that no proposal to require deletion of the data was under consideration.

On 18 August 2025 MoRTH circulated its[ Policy for Data Sharing from the National Transport Repository](https://morth.nic.in/sites/default/files/circulars_document/Data-Sharing-policy-20082025-merged.pdf?ref=static.internetfreedom.in), which reopened API, portal and bulk channels to private recipients such as banks, insurers, vehicle manufacturers and “transport service providing agencies”, with personal data to be released on an Aadhaar-linked OTP consent. We[ explained the policy at the time](https://internetfreedom.in/data-highways-rights-roadblocks-an-explainer-on-the-national-transport-repository/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in). It is an executive circular with no statutory backing; it names MoRTH as the data fiduciary and the approving authority; it has no public register of recipients and no grievance mechanism; and under clause 4.3 it gives police, law enforcement and national security agencies “complete access to all data parameters, including Personal Data.” Even before that, when[ MediaNama asked MoRTH under the RTI Act in 2025](https://www.medianama.com/2025/06/223-api-access-vehicle-data-sharing-raising-privacy-concerns/?ref=static.internetfreedom.in) which private companies had API access, the Ministry confirmed that government organisations did and ignored the questions about private ones.

Then, on 1 September 2026, the security firm Cyderes published[ an investigation](https://www.cyderes.com/howler-cell/inside-indian-data-brokerage?ref=static.internetfreedom.in)into a Telegram brokerage selling live VAHAN records at ₹5 a query. The records, it found, were being drawn through API credentials issued to licensed identity-verification intermediaries, not through any breach of a government server. Its request logs ran from September 2025 to April 2026. Cyderes reported its findings to CERT-In and to the affected companies on 1 June 2026, and said that one route was still returning full records when it published.

# What we asked, and of whom

Our two RTI applications of 22 September 2026 were split by role.[ MoRTH](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1FBL9sTsSro6mkrxANCVpiuXbRgCAj7rc/view?usp=sharing&ref=static.internetfreedom.in)(Registration No. MORTH/R/E/26/05057) was asked twelve questions about policy and authorisation, the names of private entities given API, portal or bulk access since 4 June 2020 and the data fields approved for each; the number of applications under the NTR Policy and how many were approved, rejected or pending; a copy of the undertaking private recipients sign and its clause on resale; whether AuthBridge (TruthScreen), Invincible Ocean, SurePass or the developer of the Vehicle Information App had held access; suspensions, debarments and audits; complaints about the sale of this data and the action taken; correspondence with CERT-In, MeitY, NIC and Google; FIRs filed; whether deletion was sought of data sold under the 2019 policy; the order deciding which fields are masked in public lookups; which entities other than MoRTH and NIC may send OTPs or SMS to vehicle owners; and the revenue earned each year since 2020-21. We asked that exempt portions be severed under Section 10 and that anything held elsewhere be transferred under Section 6(3).

[NIC](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EljvwlrDQGjqM4wrZ301kIOZuwMXCeDl/view?usp=sharing&ref=static.internetfreedom.in) (Registration No. NICHQ/R/E/26/00591), which builds and runs these systems, was asked sixteen technical questions, how many credentials had been issued to government and private entities, their validity and access conditions, monthly query volumes, how credentials are monitored, how long API, SMS and database logs are kept and whether any had been ordered preserved, the SMS sender IDs and OTP accounts, whether any third-party application had been found triggering Parivahan OTPs, the cybersecurity incidents received, whether the CERT-In disclosure had reached NIC and what followed, security audits, unauthorised access by staff or vendors, and which fields are masked in public lookups but released through private APIs.

# Analysis

# The sequence

Sequence of events, 1 September to 16 October 2026

We asked the Ministry on 22 September who has access to this data, on what terms, and what has been done about reports that it is being sold. Nine days later, sharing with private entities ended. We learned of that on 16 October, from NIC, in answer to a question about the number of credentials in circulation. MoRTH has not told us that it took the decision, when it took it, on what material, or why. Its own reply of 24 September says nothing about it. We are not in a position to say that the Ministry acted because of our representation or our RTI, and we do not say so. What we can say is that a Ministry which was about to switch off a national data sharing arrangement answered a citizen asking about that arrangement by pointing him to a webpage describing it. If the direction was already in train on 24 September, the reply should have said so. If it came afterwards, the public is entitled to know what prompted it. That question is now before the First Appellate Authority.

# What NIC told us

NIC’s reply, signed by its CPIO on 16 October 2026, runs to thirteen numbered parts. The figures it discloses are these.

Seventeen million queries over 33 months is roughly 17,000 lookups of individual records every day. NIC does not explain the gap between 338 credentials “recorded” and 25,314 “issued”. The likeliest reading is that 338 is a snapshot of the register when the CPIO ran his query, after the switch-off, and 25,314 is the cumulative number created over the period, with credentials renewed annually and issued per user or per integration; it is also possible that 338 counts approved entities rather than credentials. On either reading about 25,000 credentials were issued and are no longer on the register, and NIC gives no figure for how many of those were revoked, how many expired, and when. On the terms on which private entities held access, it says only that these “were governed by the MoRTH Data Sharing Policy in force during the relevant period.” It does not name a single holder.

# Query volumes fell by more than half between July and September 2025, and NIC does not say why.

NIC reply to RTI NICHQ/R/E/26/00591 dated 16.10.2026, query 5 table, January 2024 to September 2026

Between January 2024 and July 2025 the volume stayed between roughly 590,000 and 940,000 queries a month, averaging 695,366. It then dropped to 452,616 in August 2025, 278,164 in September and 239,659 in October, and from September 2025 to September 2026 it averaged 262,725 a
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document fetched 2026-10-21 00:25 · canonical https://reddit.com/r/india/comments/1xan1wh/who_reads_your_vehicle_record_nic_gave_us_numbers
