# Using LAPS all the time vs domain accounts — retained record

> Retained reddit record from reddit:cybersecurity.

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source: [reddit](https://highsignal.app/data/reddit) (reddit:cybersecurity)  published 2026-11-03 16:52 ingested 2026-11-04 02:37

[original source ↗](https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1xmy7kq/using_laps_all_the_time_vs_domain_accounts/)

## retained text



```
Our remote support technicians have dedicated administrator accounts that they use for day-to-day IT support. These accounts are a member of the local administrator group on all workstations in the domain or in their respective regions.

Would there be any practical security benefit if I could give these technicians accounts the ability to remotely access a PC without local administrative privileges but if they need to do any elevation, they need to use the managed LAPS account (Which the remote support software can automatically pull and inject)?

  
I'm conflicted in what my thoughts are. On one hand, getting credentials to a technicians account would grant you local admin on all workstations they are configured as one on. On the same end, this is still possible because now you can just get the LAPS password for all the computers and you're in the same position (An important note is that in order for the remote support tool to work, the managed LAPS account needs to be able to do a network logon).

The only benefit I'm seeing is that if a computer gets compromised, they only get whatever is on that machine. If they somehow extract the domain account, they don't get admin everywhere on other workstations.
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document fetched 2026-11-04 00:23 · canonical https://reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1xmy7kq/using_laps_all_the_time_vs_domain_accounts
