# Five days before the French supermarket fridge attack, France had more exposed Danfoss StoreView dashboards than the rest of the world combined — retained record

> Retained reddit record from reddit:cybersecurity.

Canonical: https://highsignal.app/data/records/dab6fd7c222f80a9

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source: [reddit](https://highsignal.app/data/reddit) (reddit:cybersecurity)  published 2026-10-20 21:08 ingested 2026-10-21 02:36

[original source ↗](https://www.reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1xb4906/five_days_before_the_french_supermarket_fridge/)

## retained text



```
I work at IPinfo, which runs weekly scans of the IPv4 Internet. After the October 11–12 attack that pushed refrigeration in hundreds of French supermarkets into defrost, we went back through those scans to count Danfoss StoreView dashboards, the web front end for the AK-SM controllers named in the reports.

What the October 6–7 scan found:

* 2,528 addresses with a StoreView dashboard, in 73 countries and territories
* France: 1,331 (53%), more than everywhere else combined. Then Poland 179, US 101, Portugal 92, Belgium 85
* 85% of the French ones ran software with known flaws: 527 end-of-life AK-SM 800 units, 280 missing the 2023 fixes, 329 missing the 2025 fixes. Only 195 had every fix. The rest of the world was about the same (84%), so France had more of them online, not worse patching
* 98% sat on telecom networks, not in data centers. That fits a controller on the store’s own line, opened up for a technician or head office
* Not new: 1,019 of the French addresses were already open on March 30

After the attack, the October 14 scan found 316 of the 1,331 French dashboards still online, a 76% drop against a normal 3–7% a week. Fully patched units dropped too (195 → 54), so stores disconnected rather than patched. Censys saw a similar 71% drop.

Method: the newer UI is matched on page title, the older AK-SM 800 on its web server plus the Flash loader page, and the firmware generation comes from the build date the dashboard shows. Counts are addresses on the ports we scan, so they’re a floor. AK-SC 355 units may be missing. We removed 16 non-Danfoss devices that share the old web server, and two honeypot-like hosts.

What we can’t say is how the attackers got in. Exposure isn’t proof that this was the way in.

Full write-up with charts: [https://ipinfo.io/blog/france-fridges-hack](https://ipinfo.io/blog/france-fridges-hack)
```



document fetched 2026-10-21 00:23 · canonical https://reddit.com/r/cybersecurity/comments/1xb4906/five_days_before_the_french_supermarket_fridge
