Stop trying to prompt your way to agent safety. It's an access-control problem
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Every "rogue agent" thread this week is describing the same bug: an agent holding a broad tool grant, chasing a goal, with no boundary between the two. That is a permissions problem, the oldest one in computing. Systems security solved this shape decades ago with least privilege. A process gets the narrowest permission that lets it finish, nothing more. Agents shipped without that step. A model can plan any action; what matters is what the executor allows. The common version: an agent picks up a cleanup task, holds a broad delete capability, and removes far more than anyone meant. Nothing scoped what it could reach, so goal-seeking reached everywhere. **What actually contains it:** * Least privilege per tool call. The narrowest grant that finishes the step, not standing access to everything. * Allow-lists over deny-lists. You can name what it should do. You cannot name everything it should not. * Approval gates on the irreversible and the expensive (deletes, payments, outbound sends), not on every step, or people just rubber-stamp. * Budgets and rate limits per capability, so a runaway loop cannot run the cost or the blast radius up. * Enforcement outside the model. The thing that says no belongs in the execution path, not the prompt. A system prompt that says "do not touch production" will not stop anything. The model can rationalize its way past a line written in text. In production, are you scoping tool access per call, or handing the agent one standing grant and hoping the prompt holds?
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