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I helped scale lemlist from $3M to $25M ARR, then quit to build my own SaaS. 2 years in, 20 paying customers. Here’s why I killed it.

source: reddit (reddit:SaaS)published 2026-11-17 10:53ingested 2026-11-18 02:38

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I was alone at my desk, looking at a deal that went nowhere after weeks of chasing it, with no money left, and for the first time ever I just thought: it’s probably time to stop

Some context: I was Head of Product at lemlist while it went from $3M to $25M ARR, fully bootstrapped

My biggest pain there was handling the amount of customer feedback we had, scattered across calls, Intercom, Slack, reviews, CRM notes. Nobody had time to read it all, and how can you call yourself customer-centric if you can’t see the patterns in all that?

So in November 2023 I quit to build the tool I wished I had. With my co-founder we built ListenUp: it pulled feedback from everywhere and used AI to group it into insights

The numbers:

* 10 paying companies, with high churn
* 100+ demos, all by me
* 2 people, no funding
* I lived on unemployment benefits, then on freelance gigs when that ran out. Survival mode, all the time.

Here’s what killed it:

1. **The alternatives were good enough.** In one demo, a PM told me straight up she didn’t have the problem I was solving. Notion was enough for her and she didn’t see herself switching. She was right.
2. **So we pivoted just a bit. It didn’t save us.** We thought okay, people WANT to stay in Notion, let’s just become a Notion connector. We built a really good product: a Notion template with our connectors and AI engine on top. Demos went better and interest went up, but it still wasn’t enough to grow faster, because the existing options were still good enough, and the pain wasn’t intense enough for the people we were targeting.
3. **The real pain was in big companies, and we kept selling to small ones.** For months we ignored the fact that SMBs didn’t have the problem we were solving, but mid-market and even enterprise companies did. The catch: they had to trust a 2-person vendor in their house, with a tool that could access their most sensitive company data. So winning deals was extremely hard, and funded competitors with worse products won them instead.
4. **A better opportunity was right under our eyes.** We had built a great bot-free meeting recorder, before those became the default (like Granola) Some users ONLY used that, and they were happy. We should have sold just that, either as a generic meeting recorder or as a sales call tool. Instead we kept trying to build an ambitious all-in-one feedback and user research platform.

Here are the lessons I’ve learned from this experience:

* Don’t fall in love with your product or your ambition pre-PMF. Be ready to pivot to something completely unrelated if that’s where the market pull is
* Don’t wait months. Give each attempt a few weeks, then try another one based on where the market is telling you to go.
* Rinse and repeat before scaling anything. Don’t try to build a platform or scale multiple GTM channels at once, it’s pure madness.

Fast forward to today: I’m now growing +30% every month with my new startup, still making a bunch of mistakes and learning every day. 

Never stop trying!

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