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Ivanti Connect Secure zero-day chain (CVE-2026-104935) got root on a fully patched 22.8R2.4 VPN from October 3, and Ivanti had fixed part of it on one branch in July

source: reddit (reddit:sysadmin)published 2026-10-14 08:36ingested 2026-10-15 02:41

retained text

CVE-2026-104935 in Ivanti Connect Secure went public on October 13, and [CISA added it to KEV](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/13/cisa-urges-patching-newly-exploited-vulnerability-ivanti-connect-secure) the same day. Federal agencies have until [October 16](https://securityaffairs.com/200887/security/u-s-cisa-adds-ivanti-connect-secure-flaw-to-its-known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog.html). [Volexity](https://www.volexity.com/blog/2026/10/13/a-series-of-unauthenticated-events-chained-exploitation-of-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-days/) found it while working an incident at a customer. The actor, which it tracks as UTA0576, started on October 3 against an appliance running 22.8R2.4, the fully patched build at the time.

The way in is welcome.cgi, the public login page. A request to it can carry a header naming a script that sits behind the login, and that script runs. A race in the wu.cgi upload handler turns that into code execution, and a third bug in the dsinvoked service gets root. Ivanti’s patch covers the first two (on the 22.8 line that’s 22.8R2.5, per [SecurityWeek](https://www.securityweek.com/ivanti-zero-day-chain-gave-attackers-root-access-to-fully-patched-vpn/)). The root escalation is still open.

Once in, the actor used the appliance’s own AD service account to search for LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys. Volexity says Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool doesn’t detect it, because the exploit patches a library in memory and then puts it back. CISA [wrote the same about that tool in February 2024](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-060b), after the CVE-2023-46805 attacks.

Ivanti told [CyberScoop](https://cyberscoop.com/ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-actively-exploited/) it found a portion of this bug in internal checks in June, and that it “did not meet the threshold for an out-of-band release.” [Rapid7](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-ivanti-connect-secure-zero-day-exploited-in-the-wild-cve-2026-104935/) quotes Ivanti saying that portion was fixed in [25.1.3.0](http://25.1.3.0) in July. The exploitation started while the backport to the older lines was still in progress.

The WordPress version of that public page is wp-login.php, sitting at the same default path on every install.

CISA’s alert also says 22.8, the line Volexity saw hit, reaches end of life on January 31, 2027. If Ivanti knew about part of this bug in June and shipped the fix to one branch in July, who should get to decide that everyone on the other branches can wait for the normal release cycle?

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