100+ cloned GitHub repos pushing Remus Botnet via password-protected releases, and a registrar that wants a trademark before it will act
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**TL;DR:** Someone is mass-producing fake repos on GitHub (game mods, Windows utils) that lead to a Remus Botnet payload. The archive is password-protected, so GitHub's scanners can't look inside. The gateway domain's registrar (Openprovider) said no to takedown without a trademark/power of attorney or a court order. I've reported it to ICANN, the .art registry, GitHub and Google. IOCs below. **What I found** Disposable accounts create repos that look like mods for games like Project Zomboid 3D, Minecraft tools and Windows utilities. Each README sends you to an external "installation guide" page, mylunora\[.\]art, hosted on Vercel. The page gives you the password for an archive (Release.zip) that's attached to the repo's GitHub Release. Since the archive is encrypted, I assume GitHub's static scanning can't see the binary. Running the extracted executable makes outbound connections to a live Remus Botnet C2 at slink4u\[.\]click (77.90.4\[.\]104:9692). **The registrar's answer** mylunora\[.\]art is registered through Openprovider (Hosting Concepts B.V.). I sent them sandbox traces, memory dumps and the IOCs. The reply came from a reseller, forwarded by the registrar, and refused to act because: * I had no power of attorney or trademark registration proving I represent the impersonated brand. * I had no binding court order or injunction. >"We cannot process your abuse report without an officially executed Power of Attorney or verified trademark registration demonstrating your standing to act on behalf of the referenced entities, or a binding court order." So a registrar is asking for a trademark registration certificate before it will act on a documented Remus Botnet payload. I don't think a trademark or court order should be required to act on an active botnet delivery site. My reading is that this conflicts with the DNS Abuse obligations in Section 3.18 of ICANN's 2013 RAA, so I escalated it there. **How big the cluster is** GitHub's own code search doesn't show these repos, probably because of indexing filters on new accounts. Google does: `site:github.com "mylunora.art"` Add `&filter=0` to the results URL to turn off duplicate grouping. You'll get 10+ pages of near-identical bot-generated repos pointing at the same gateway. **What I've reported** * ICANN Compliance, under RAA Section 3.18, for the registrar's failure to mitigate. * The .art registry operator (UK Creative Ideas Limited), asking for an emergency serverHold. * GitHub Trust & Safety, as a bulk ticket with the search pattern "mylunora.art". * Google Safe Browsing, for the gateway and the payload. * Vercel, via their abuse contact, for the gateway page. **IOCs (defanged)** * Gateway: hxxps://mylunora\[.\]art (hosted on Vercel) * Archive password: `i2D3*!_s` * Payload SHA-256: `5641448d894d37308d760d96a1975145ce40d258b2c94d9ba8c8a6bf05e126c3` * C2: slink4u\[.\]click, 77.90.4\[.\]104:9692 (Remus Botnet, [ThreatFox IOC #1973657](https://threatfox.abuse.ch/ioc/1973657/)) * Sandbox run: [https://tria.ge/261024-nlnhyaeh32](https://tria.ge/261024-nlnhyaeh32) If you've seen the same pattern with other domains or registrars, I'd like to compare notes.
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