Microsoft 365 device-code phishing — how are you handling this with Conditional Access?
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I've been looking more closely at Microsoft's recent reporting around device-code phishing. The part I find interesting is that device-code authentication itself is legitimate. The problem is that attackers can abuse that trusted authentication flow by convincing a user to authorize a session. For M365 environments, that raises a practical question: Are you blocking device-code authentication completely with Conditional Access, or keeping it enabled for specific users/devices that still require it? I'm particularly interested in how people are handling exceptions for things like Teams Rooms, shared devices, CLI/IoT use cases, etc. Also curious whether anyone is actively monitoring device-code sign-ins rather than only relying on CA to block them.
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