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Two widely used npm packages had their security advisories withdrawn. How should we handle false positives in dependency audits?

source: reddit (reddit:devops)published 2026-10-26 00:34ingested 2026-10-27 02:36

retained text

Both the braces and sprintf-js security advisories have been withdrawn, despite previously being marked as GitHub Reviewed.

[braces: CVE-2026-93687 / GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfj7-8cjw-p6xm)  
[sprintf-js: CVE-2026-97058 / GHSA-hp3w-g68c-fv3c](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hp3w-g68c-fv3c)

I understand that third-party security risks are a pressing concern. Last week was particularly rough, with incidents and critical vulnerabilities involving LiteLLM, PHP, intermediate CAs, Brotli, and more. Security teams everywhere have been scrambling to assess their exposure and mitigate potential risks.

However, these two widely used npm packages, commonly pulled in through linters, test frameworks, and other development tools, have once again caused unnecessary alarm across the ecosystem.

Both advisories have now been withdrawn, but not before triggering security alerts and forcing developers to investigate issues that turned out not to be practically exploitable.

**How much can we trust automated dependency audits when even reviewed security advisories can turn out to be false positives?**

More importantly, what should change in how vulnerability reports are vetted, published, and propagated to downstream security tools?

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