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NIST RMF: Risk management or bureaucracy?

source: reddit (reddit:cybersecurity)published 2026-10-10 22:33ingested 2026-10-11 02:37

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I'll be honest: the RMF (NIST SP 800-37) confuses me, and I'm starting to think it's a bureaucracy monster wearing a "risk management" costume.

My org wants us to work risk-based and *enable* the business, not block it. At the same time, we're supposed to apply the RMF. But the RMF's whole point is *formal authorization* – an ATO. That's the opposite of enabling, that's gating.

Context: our IT is immature and chaotic. Most software is purchased (COTS), implemented by external contractors, poorly planned and designed. Roll-outs are creeping, no clear go-live, no standard project phases or solution design approaches.

Where is the risk? Categorization estimates impact--fine, call that inherent risk. Then you pick an 800-53 baseline, tailor it, hand it to IT. IT is overwhelmed, forwards it to the contractor, who pitches their default security slogans "SSO and access control is available, but firewall and encryption is your problem." 

Security already provides common controls: Firewall, vuln management, SIEM, SWG, WAF, IGA. Any new system just integrates with those. Period. No RMF needed. Simple set of mandatory requirements. The firewall is even a built-in enforcement point: no broad access until the integrations are proven. Done.

**So my actual question:** anyone here in the private sector, under \~100k employees, using the RMF and able to report something *positive*? Value-adding? Risk-reducing?

I'd love a practical example of how it runs at your shop, and how much personnel effort it costs. Because from where I sit, the RMF is 10% risk management and 90% paperwork.

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